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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the influence of international resource price movements on 
capital outflows from resource-rich developing countries (RRDCs) by distinguishing 
capital flight and capital transfers. The volume of capital flight and transfers are 
calculated and their determinants are analyzed using macro-panel data constituting 21 
resource-rich developing countries from 1990 to 2011. Through the regression analysis, 
the linkage between capital flight and resource revenue as well as that between capital 
flight and debt is suggested. The results of this analysis suggest the need to focus on 
capital outflow from RRDCs through transnational companies.  
 Keywords: Africa, Asia, capital flight, resource rich developing countries  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Countries with rich natural-resource endowment have experienced prolonged 
economic stagnation from the 1980s to the 1990s. Many studies on this paradoxical 
situation, named resource curse, have accumulated (e.g., Auty, 1990; Gelb and 
associates, 1988; Karl, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001). The focus of the 
resource-curse literature varies from Dutch disease (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 
1984; Cuddington, 1989), to economic volatility and policy pro-cyclicality (Budina et al, 
2007; Nissanke, 2010), and rent-seeking activities, which represent the argument in the 
arena of political economy (Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003; Karl, 1997). 
 Sachs and Warner (2001) use 1970–1989 data and visually and clearly 
demonstrate the negative relationship between dependence on commodity exports and 
per capita economic growth rate, which has become one of the stylized facts of the 
resource curse. In fact, this same clear relationship cannot be replicated anymore with 
the data for the new millennium. Since 2000, many resource-rich developing countries 
(RRDCs) have been experiencing an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
higher resource revenue and continue to register rapid economic growth rates. Today, 
RRDCs appear to have overcome the resource curse and gained advantages that permit 
them to boost their own economies. However, it is also true that large populations in 
RRDCs still suffer from weak government institutions, immature financial systems, 
poor public infrastructure, high unemployment, and poverty, regardless of the extent of 
their resource incomes and their relatively high GDP growth rates (IMF, 2012). 
 
This study investigates the influence of international resource price movements on 
capital outflows from RRDCs. One basic assumption of this study is that a large share 
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of resource revenue is not domestically invested but is simply consumed or flows 
abroad. Drawing on this premise, this study calculates the volume of capital outflows 
from RRDCs. 
One reason for focusing on capital outflows from RRDCs is the similar 
characteristics between the capital-flight ridden countries and the resource-curse 
suffering countries. Noteworthy analyses on international capital movements have 
focused on capital flight, mostly during the 1980s–1990s when many developing 
countries (and private banks in developed countries) suffered from financial crises 
(Cuddington, 1986, 1987, 1989; Dooley et al, 1986; Dornbusch, 1985; Lessard and 
Williamson, 1987). These analyses offer great insight into and knowledge on the 
conditions for and causes of capital flight from heavily indebted countries. The main 
characteristics of countries that suffered heavy capital flight during this period include 
currency overvaluation, high inflation rate, financial repression, high risk associated 
with domestic assets, and above all, the inflow of foreign capital in the form of foreign 
debt.  
The above characteristics of countries that suffered heavy capital flight in the 
1980s also apply to RRDCs. In particular, many RRDCs experienced an influx of 
foreign capital in the form of resource revenues, especially in the new millennium when 
international resource prices increased. Because many developing countries share weak 
institutions and other economic characteristics, capital inflows as RRDCs’ resource 
revenue are also suspected to be linked with capital outflows.  
 
Another reason for focusing on capital outflows from the RRDCs is their 
paradoxical economic situation. While it is regarded as normal behavior for residents in 
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developed countries to hold their assets abroad or invest abroad to maximize their 
investment returns (Lessard and Williamson, 1987: 201), there are good reasons to 
believe that the increase in foreign asset holdings of RRDC residents is not entirely 
clear. Although a typical RRDC receives huge resource revenues, its domestic 
economies are still underdeveloped. More precisely, many RRDCs lack economic 
infrastructure, effective health care and education systems, and domestic jobs. In sum, 
many RRDCs are in need of additional domestic investment and possibly suffer from 
domestic capital shortage despite their rich cash inflow. 
 
To further develop the discussion on capital outflows in the context of RRDCs, this 
paper distinguishes between capital flight and capital transfer. While both are 
considered as capital outflow, capital flight is interpreted as the increase in private 
foreign assets held by RRDC residents. Capital transfer, on the other hand, is the 
outflow of capital, of which ownership is transferred to the residents living outside 
RRDCs. In particular, this study focuses on the operation of private transnational 
companies (TNCs) in RRDCs as an important conduit of these capital transfers. Capital 
transfer is especially important in RRDCs because many TNCs operate within the 
natural resource industries and their influence on the local economy is historically large 
in many cases. As international resource prices increase, these TNCs are also expected 
to be influenced by the change.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews stylized 
facts on capital flight and summarizes the relationship between FDI and capital transfers 
to investigate how these factors affect resource-rich countries. Section 3 presents 
definitions for both capital flight and transfers from RRDCs and calculates their 
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volumes. Section 4 presents a panel-data analysis on the determinants of capital 
outflows using calculated data for 21 countries from 1990 to 2011. The final section 
concludes. 
 
2. CAPITAL FLIGHT AND CAPITAL TRANSFER   
(a) Capital flight 
Capital outflows from developing countries became a subject of debate during the 
1980s’ Latin American debt crisis. A large portion of the foreign capital injected into 
crisis-ridden countries as development assistance or new loans is suggested to have 
“round-tripped” out of these countries into foreign bank accounts as private assets (Kant, 
1996; Pastor, 1990). There is no formal definition of capital flight, and thus, the range of 
capital movement included as capital flight and its estimated values varies depending on 
a study’s aims and methods (Ajayi, 1995). On one hand, capital flight can be understood 
as being rational profit maximization by the residents of developing countries, on the 
other hand, it can be regarded as a way these residents protect their assets from their 
local high-risk political and economic environment. These international capital 
movements can be either legal or illegal.  
Several authors note the harmful effects of capital flight on the country losing this 
capital. For example, Cuddington (1986) and Pastor (1990) indicate that capital flight 
destabilizes the domestic interest rate and exchange rate, which weaken the effect of 
financial policies. Capital flight also accelerates inequality by distorting the distribution 
of wealth. In addition, it could erode the potential tax base and simultaneously reduce 
domestic investment. 
Other literatures note that political and economic instability and sudden changes in 
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economic policy are the primary forces triggering capital flight. People also transfer 
their assets to overseas bank accounts, where the currency is more stable, when they see 
signs of high inflation or an overvalued exchange rate in their countries (Ajayi, 1995; 
Cuddington, 1986, 1987; Dornbusch, 1985; Lessard and Williamson, 1987; Pastor, 
1990). Dornbusch (1985) also highlights that a large government budget deficit is 
sometimes followed by either higher taxes or seigniorage, which also accelerate capital 
flight. Furthermore, against the background of today’s globalized environment, it is 
natural to expect investors to shift their assets abroad when the domestic financial sector 
is underdeveloped, thus failing to present attractive investment opportunities. A weak 
financial system also implies the absence of a legal system to protect depositors, which 
is another possible cause of capital flight. Moreover, corruption among politicians and 
high-profile government officers, who have relatively easier access to foreign currencies, 
can exacerbate capital flight. International development aid from other governments 
sometimes offers significant opportunities for capital flight because foreign lending is 
tantamount to a supply of foreign currency (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011b: 66–67).  
In addition to the above-mentioned causes of capital flight, such pull factors as 
higher overseas interest rates or the existence of tax havens and banks with a high 
degree of secrecy are also considered to be good incentives for capital flight (Walter, 
1987, 1989). 
 
The most important point of the debate on capital flight is that the inflow of foreign 
capital, whether debt or aid, is directly linked to capital flight. At first, some authors saw 
capital flight in the 1980s as a theoretical and conceptual puzzle. This was because 
capital flew out of capital-scarce (and thus presumably higher-return) developing 
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counties. However, capital flight from Latin American countries has attracted so much 
attention because private assets were accumulated by sacrificing the public sector whose 
liabilities increased. Put differently, public capital flowed in as debt, of which creditors 
were the residents outside the debtor country. This debt was then turned into the private 
assets of residents of the debtor country who did not compensate for their gains.  
 
Examining present-day RRDCs, there is huge inflow of foreign capital, but this can 
be linked to capital outflows. Adding to this, the local economic and political situation 
is not very different from the capital-flight-ridden countries discussed above. Indeed, as 
Ndikumana and Boyce suggest, prices of natural resources such as crude oil are 
commonly denominated and transacted in U.S. dollars, and thus, sales profits as well as 
other natural-resource revenues, such as signing bonuses or royalties, can be sources of 
additional private foreign assets for those who have access to them (Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 2011b: 67–71). Moreover, if an RRDC is already experiencing an economic 
structural transformation through the Dutch disease, the economy has already become 
highly dependent on its natural resources while having let its other industrial sectors 
decline. This economic situation is even more likely to induce capital flight due to 
economic volatility and a high inflation rate, which are suggested as characteristics of 
resource-dependent economies (Budina and Wijnbergen, 2008; Nissanke, 2010). With 
the globalization of the financial services industry, it is not rare for even the residents of 
less-developed countries to hold private assets abroad. Today, it may seem to be 
anachronistic to simply criticize the outflow of private capital from developing 
countries. However, an increase in private foreign assets can still be considered harmful. 
Adding to the harmful effects of capital flight discussed above, in many RRDCs, 
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investment outside the resource sector is not booming, regardless of the high-GDP 
growth rate. Moreover, investment in the development of the resource sector is mainly 
carried out by the TNCs through FDI. Given the relatively high-international resource 
prices, resource revenues should have accumulated in RRDCs; however, the revenues 
have not been redistributed or reinvested within their domestic economies. 
 
(b) Capital transfer 
The agent of capital outflows from RRDCs is not only private individual resident, 
but also TNCs that are expected to play an important role. The ties between 
governments and TNCs are particularly strong in resource-rich countries, where 
resource extraction and the operation of natural resource industries are heavily 
dependent on advanced technologies and huge capital provided by TNCs. For instance, 
crude oil production in many former colonial countries was initiated by the foreign 
private companies which later become TNCs, in cooperation with the colonial 
governments. Indeed, these companies had waves of nationalization, and many 
international oil companies formed joint ventures with these governments (Jones, 2005: 
213–214). Nevertheless, international resource companies remained very influential 
within RRDCs through the era of nationalization or confiscation until today. Karl (2007) 
pointed out that in the case of oil companies operating within RRDCs, these companies 
continue to generate huge profits from natural resource production.  
It is worth noting that while the increase in foreign investment inflows to RRDCs 
is welcomed, the proportion of profits in the local economy is expected to be small 
(Auty, 2006; Ferguson, 2005, 2006). Moreover, in the value chain of energy products 
and minerals, natural resources that are exported out of host countries are largely 
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unprocessed, and the majority share of product value is outside of RRDCs. Thus, a large 
share of the profits that accrue to these natural resources is earned outside of RRDCs. 
For example, Nigeria, one of the major African crude oil exporters, depends on crude 
oil for more than 90% of its export earnings, but the country imports a large amount of 
gasoline and other fossil fuels that are processed abroad (National Bureau of Statistics 
Nigeria, 2011). This is partly due to Nigeria’s lack of domestic refining capacity. But 
the policies of oil majors also matter. In general, it is more efficient and cost effective 
for TNCs to produce higher value-added products in a location where stable electricity 
is supplied, transportation is cheaper, and that is accessible to consumers. 
 While there is nothing wrong with this international corporate behavior in the 
context of corporate management and profit maximization, it is the reason why FDI in 
developing countries’ extractive industries is less of a benefit to host countries, as 
suggested by Asiedue (2006). Because the higher value-adding processing phase takes 
place outside of RRDCs, little technology and knowledge is diffused to the host 
economy. Extractive industries in developing countries also have few forward or 
backward linkages to other industrial sectors, and as a result, investment in the resource 
sector does not spread to the other sectors of the local economy. Moreover, the industry 
is very capital intensive and, consequently, does not produce much local employment 
(Ross, 2012). 
All of these characteristics of foreign investment in resource industries suggest that 
while TNCs are expected to earn profits as international resource prices increase, their 
earnings are less likely to be reinvested or distributed to the host economy but rather are 
taken back to their home country or to tax havens. In short, an increase in the 
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international resource price will increase capital transfers from RRDCs to the foreign 
private companies.  
While this analysis focuses on capital transfers via private companies, it is 
noteworthy that these companies are also important conduits of capital flight from 
developing countries. For instance, Ajayi (1995) suggests the possibility of capital flight 
for tax evasion or avoidance. This activity seems to be common among not only private 
individuals but also among private enterprises and TNCs.  
Indeed, TNC activity is deeply related to capital flight when it transfers taxable 
liquid assets for tax evasion or avoidance. Some literature suggests that the development 
of tax havens and city states—such as Hong Kong and Singapore as well as the City of 
London—which function as financial centers with tax breaks, are associated with 
increases in tax evasion and avoidance, sometimes through TNCs’ use of shell 
companies (Otusanya, 2011; Shaxon, 2011; Walter, 1987, 1989). Tax evasion and 
avoidance are serious problems for industrialized countries that are the home base for 
most TNCs. Nevertheless, both the society and economy of the host countries are more 
seriously affected. Developing countries’ legal systems are often not yet fully mature 
and there are many loopholes in corporate tax law. Meanwhile, capital outflow through 
transnational corporations for tax evasion or avoidance reduces the tax base for the 
developing country’s government, which possibly retards socioeconomic development 
and impedes efforts to reduce poverty. In many RRDCs, such problems are more serious 
due to their economy’s high dependence on TNCs and the profits that are earned 
through domestic natural resource production. For example, Otusanya (2011) points out 
such problems in Nigeria, where Chevron manipulated its accounts to avoid making tax 
payments on petroleum profits, and Halliburton used an affiliate company to avoid 
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paying taxes.  
Transfer pricing is another way through which TNCs derive capital from RRDCs. 
It is suggested that TNCs charge minimum prices in their intra-firm trading to maximize 
overall profits within the group as a whole (Jones, 1995: 213). An extreme application 
of this type of transfer pricing is under-invoicing exports or over-invoicing imports. For 
example, under- and over-invoicing were commonly observed in Nigeria during the 
1970s and 1980s (Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1986: 14). These mechanisms are 
also understood as a method of capital flight and a way to avoid paying taxes in the host 
country, thereby depriving it of a rightful source of revenue. But it is difficult to 
distinguish such transfer pricing as rational actions taken for profit maximization from 
questionable behaviors perpetrated for tax evasion or avoidance. Moreover, it is difficult 
to capture the size of such under- and over-invoicing because such transactions are 
embedded in current account balances on the trade of goods and services in the 
international balance of payment (BOP) statistics. Thus, capital flight through TNCs and 
capital outflows through the mechanism of transfer pricing are not dealt with in this 
paper. 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
(a) Calculating capital flight 
 There are several traditional approaches to the estimation of capital flight in the 
literature. The most widely used approach is the “residual method,” proposed by 
Dornbusch (1985), and developed by others including Ndikumana and Boyce (2001). 
This method treats capital flight (KF1) as residual, meaning that it does not appear on 
the international payment balance, and uses BOP data accumulated by the IMF and debt 
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data accumulated by the World Bank. Capital flight is defined by the equation below. 
 
Foreign reserves increase  (∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)  + Current account deficit (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 deficit)  + 
Long-term foreign investment outflow + KF1  
＝ New debt inflow (∆𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + Long-term foreign investment inflow.   (1) 
 
In this identity, long-term foreign investment consists of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio investment (PI). Thus, 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾1 = ∆𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + (𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹)𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 − (∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 deficit).        (2)1 
 
According to the “residual method,” capital flight is estimated as the residual, 
which should be zero on an accounting basis when netting out net FDI, net Portfolio 
investment, new debt inflow, capital account deficit, and additional foreign reserves. 
Because most of the discussions in capital flight literature focus on the 1980s Latin 
American debt crisis, the assumption underlying this identity is that the countries are 
short of foreign reserves and run current account deficits, and are thus heavily indebted. 
If a country is running a current account deficit, then the shortage must be filled by FDI 
inflow, portfolio investment inflow, increasing international liabilities (borrowing), or 
the reversal of the existing foreign reserves. However, looking at the RRDCs analyzed 
in this study, especially since the new millennium, they are not typically running current 
account deficits owing to the high international resource prices. 
Moreover, it should be noted that this estimation is asymmetric as it includes only 
the current account deficit and the increase in foreign reserves. Because of the 
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asymmetry, this definition produces ambiguity in the interpretation of the negative value 
for estimated capital flight. Negative FDI and portfolio investment inflows indicate that 
FDI and portfolio investments are withdrawn. This may contribute to negative capital 
flight estimates; however, this should not be simply regarded as a reversal of capital 
flight. Interpretation of negative capital flight estimates requires caution when there is a 
decrease in foreign reserves to fill the international payment gap. 
Another strong assumption of the “residual method” is that foreign debt inflows in 
turn flow out of the debtor country, like a “revolving door,” as indicated by Boyce 
(1992). However, if a country earns a large resource windfall, the current account will 
be in surplus and the country will pay back the external debt so that the net debt transfer 
is negative, and foreign reserves may also somewhat increase. In such cases, the 
calculated capital flight can become negative, and again, this value should not be 
regarded as a reversal of capital flight. Drawing on the above observations, this analysis 
extends the “residual method.” That is, capital flight is symmetrically calculated as 
follows. 
  
KF = net FDI + net portfolio + net debt transfer + CA balance + reserve change 
(either positive or negative).                                        (3) 
 
The assumption is that if a country runs a current account surplus, it will pay back 
its foreign debt and increase its foreign reserves, and there can still be capital flight. 
This assumption is based on the perception that there are increasing numbers of foreign 
bank branches, even in developing countries, and especially where transnational 
corporations operate for natural resource production (Jones, 1993). Owing to 
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accelerated financial globalization, it is getting easier for residents in developing 
countries to access foreign bank accounts. Figure 1 shows the size of capital flight for 
the 21 countries studied here. The list of the countries and the data sources used for the 
estimation are described in Appendix a and b. 
It should be noted that this estimation does not consider the long-term interest that 
may accrue to foreign assets. Some authors, such as Hermes and Lensink (1992) and 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), focus on the stock of capital flight and estimate the 
amount of capital flight including accumulated interest. However, the weight of this 
analysis is more on the annual change in capital flight, and thus prefers to consider the 
simply calculated capital flight as the bottom line. 
According to the estimation, the size and trend of capital flight for the period 
1990–2011 significantly differs from those found in earlier studies, such as Ndikumana 
and Boyce (2003, 2011a) and Schneider (2003). For example, although the studied time 
period does not coincide, the estimated capital flight from Nigeria in Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2011a) shows a positive sign for almost whole period, while the current figure 
for capital flight takes a large, positive number only for some years. This applies to 
other countries and only a limited number of countries show consistent, positive capital 
flight throughout the entire sample period.  
 
(b) Capturing capital transfer  
The size and trend of the capital outflow from developing countries through 
foreign private companies have not attracted much academic attention. While little 
attempts have been made to estimate such values, it is difficult to determine the exact 
amount of companies’ profit repatriation from any published data. This analysis uses 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   16 
available statistical data to roughly speculate the size and trend of the capital that flows 
out of RRDCs through TNCs.  
The amount of money earned by TNCs and thus taxed by host governments and 
then sent home is recorded as primary income debit, which appears in the Current 
Account section of the Balance of Payment statistics. This amount, by far, 
underestimates the extent of repatriated earnings of foreign companies, since most 
internationally operating companies use the system of transfer pricing and use other 
accounting techniques to avoid and reduce tax payment, as described in the previous 
section. Nevertheless, primary income statistics are one of the important proxies 
available to capture the TNCs’ role as a conduit of international capital transfers.  
Alternatively, secondary income debit is also added to the primary income debit to 
be more precise. While secondary income in the BOP includes workers’ remittances, 
this amount is not large relative to the income earned by corporations, and thus the size 
and trend do not change much.  
Figure 2 shows calculated capital transfer for the 21 countries studied here. 
Because the size of capital transfer strongly depends on industry type, the size of the 
host country’s economy, and its relationship with former colonial countries, it is difficult 
to set a criterion with which one can judge whether the capital transfer is too large or 
within an acceptable range. Nonetheless, this figure helps shed light on the extent of 
TNC influence on host countries’ economies. 
Summary statistics of calculated capital flight and outflow is shown in Table 1. 
Some countries such as Azerbaijan in the late 2000s or Malaysia in 2008 show the large 
share of capital flight in GDP as around 20%, but the mean value of capital flight across 
the sample is negative. On the other hand, based on the estimation by Cuddington 
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(1987) for example, the capital flight from Latin American countries such as Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela in the 1970s and 80s, is estimated to be around 20% to 25% of 
GDP on average. It is apparent that capital flight, on average, is not that serious as in 
Latin American countries in the 1980s. On other hand, the share of capital outflow in 
GDP is relatively larger. The countries with large capital outflow share are Guyana, 
Zambia, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan, ranging from 20% to 40% of GDP in several years. 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 also shows that the average estimated size of capital transfer 
as a share of GDP is far larger than that of capital flight. This is noteworthy because, 
while historically capital flight has attracted academic interest, capital transfer has 
received less attention. 
 
4. PANEL ANALYSIS 
(a) Model 
This section analyzes the determinants of capital flight and transfer using a time 
series panel. Of greatest interest to this analysis is the influence of international resource 
price movements on capital flight and transfer. The sample includes 21 RRDCs whose 
selection is based on their respective share of natural resource rent in GDP and data 
availability. The sample period is 1990–2011. Some data is lacking for several countries, 
making the panel unbalanced. 
In this regression, the international resource price is substituted by a proxy. The 
international economic trend simultaneously affects all countries, and many resource 
price movements are correlated to each other. Using a common natural price variable for 
all countries as an explanatory variable will induce cross-sectional correlations, which 
lead to inefficient estimations (Avery, 1977). To circumvent this problem, the total 
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natural resource rent (NRR) is used as a proxy for international resource price. NRR is 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), and it is calculated 
as the difference between commodity price and average production cost, multiplied by 
production quantity (World Bank, 2011). Because NRR captures the quantity of 
resource production of the country by definition, the change in NRR should not be 
understood as simply equivalent to the price change. However, as shown in Figure 3, the 
movement of both NRR and natural resource price change are closely synchronized2. 
 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) point out that capital flight has characteristics of 
hysteresis and their estimation model includes a one-term lag for dependent variable. 
This analysis also attempts to follow their method. In the regression, to circumvent the 
unit-root process and serial correlation, capital flight is measured as a share of GDP and 
is differentiated because capital flight is a flow data, and thus takes both positive and 
negative values. On the contrary, capital transfer is also a flow data, but this is because 
this figure takes only positive values and is equivalent to the capital stock paid by the 
host economy to foreign corporations each year. Thus, the data for capita transfer is 
used as a form of natural log difference. Possibly because of this technical difference 
between capital flight estimation and capital transfer estimation, while the 
auto-regression model fits quite well for capital flight, the inclusion of a lag does not 
improve the fitness of the model for capital transfer estimation. Thus, the regression 
model is denoted as below. 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,       (4) 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 .               (5) 
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In equation (3), 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the size of capital flight previously calculated, and in 
equation (4), 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes capital transfer captured by the definition described in the 
previous section. X is a vector of the macroeconomic indices explained below, and 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are error terms. The explanatory variables such as NRR and the ones included 
in X are assumed to be exogenous to capital flight and capital transfer.  
  
(b) Explanatory variables 
The selection of explanatory variables here is based on capital flight literature as 
discussed below. Most of the data is taken from the BOP and the WDI. The detailed 
definition and data source is described in appendix c.  
  
Public Debt Flow [DEBT]: If new capital inflows as foreign borrowing indeed induces 
and accelerates capital flight, as suggested by Dornbusch (1985), Cuddington (1987), 
Pastor (1990), and Boyce (1992), an increase in debt flow leads to an increase in capital 
flight (KF1). On the other hand, if this relationship does not apply, it suggests that the 
mechanism of the Latin American debt crisis is not universal, regardless of the 
similarities in the economic and political situations in RRDCs. While it is notoriously 
difficult to measure the amount of new debt transfer or flow, for technical reasons, the 
annual change rate of total debt stock including short-term debt is used. This figure 
includes publicly guaranteed debt as well as non-guaranteed private debt.  
 
Natural Resource Rent [NRR]: When international price and resource revenue increase, 
NRR also increases. The increase in resource revenue means an increase in foreign 
capital inflows. If this capital is the source of additional foreign assets of RRDC 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   20 
residents, the increase in NRR leads to increased capital flight. Also, a natural resource 
price increase should lead to higher profits for resource-extracting companies. If these 
TNCs are shifting profits out of RRDCs, the increase in NRR will lead to higher capital 
transfers.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment inflow [FDI]: In the period studied, a large amount of FDI is 
directed to RRDCs’ natural resource sector (World Economic Forum et al, 2011). Some 
RRDCs are indeed improving their investment climate and attracting more FDI, 
although investment in RRDCs is reported to be increasing regardless of political and 
economic risk within the host country’s economies. This increased FDI inflows can be a 
reflection of the favorable local economic situation, which leads to a decline in capital 
flight. On the other hand, from the corporate side, the increased FDI must be linked to 
an increase in current or future profits, thus leading to an increase in capital transfers. 
 
Inflation rate [INFLATION]: Drawing on Cuddington (1987) and Dooley (1988), 
this analysis includes the inflation rate as an explanatory variable, but not the real 
interest rate for data incompleteness. It is expected that the higher the inflation rate, the 
lower the real interest rate, and this will lead to capital flight. On the other hand, the 
influence of inflation on capital transfers is ambiguous because TNCs deal with foreign 
currencies, which are immune from the local currency’s value fluctuations. 
 
Oil Rent Share [OIL RENTS]: The problems of the natural resource curse are 
sometimes discussed in the context of crude oil producer countries and named as the 
“oil curse,” because oil-producing countries tend to have more serious economic, 
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political, and social problems (Ross, 2012). To capture the special characteristics of oil 
countries, a dummy variable can be included. However, there is no simple criterion for 
an oil country. For example, Indonesia is indeed producing crude oil, but it is a net oil 
importer, and the economy is less dependent on oil production compared to other 
countries that produce an equivalent amount of crude oil. Thus, to capture an economy’s 
dependence on crude oil production, the oil-rent share of GDP is employed instead of 
the dummy. 
 
Africa dummy [AFRICA]: Some estimations on capital flight from African countries 
suggest the distinguishingly large size of capital flight from the natural resource-rich 
countries such as Nigeria (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003, 
2011a, 2011b; Schneider, 2003). The World Bank report in 1993 noted the huge capital 
flight from Latin America, adding that “…Sub-Saharan Africa stands much worse than 
Latin America and the Caribbean” (World Bank, 1993: 24). Furthermore, World 
Financial Markets issued by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company also names Nigeria 
alongside South Africa in the list of the 18 worst-affected countries from capital flight 
(Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1986: 13). Thus, to capture African characteristics, 
the Africa dummy is included for the Sub-Saharan African countries. 
  
There are several additional variables suggested to have an influence on capital 
flight in the literature. However, many of them (such as government budget deficit or 
GDP) are strongly correlated with the international price movement and resource 
revenue, and thus are avoided in this estimation. On the other hand, Cuddington (1986) 
and Pastor (1990) suggest that capital controls are effective in preventing capital 
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outflow. While capital controls influence the legal capital flow, the situation of capital 
controls is complicated, and thus, it is difficult to obtain a series of indices on capital 
control. Therefore, the existence of capital controls is not included in the regression. 
The summary statistics of the explanatory and dependent variables is shown in Table 2. 
 
(c) Adequacy of the model and data 
Macroeconomic analyses using panel data that consist of time series and 
cross-county data, in many cases, uses the fixed effect model to mitigate the bias caused 
by heterogeneity across the countries due to unobserved variables, such as technology, 
institution, culture, or geography (de Mello, 1999). This analysis includes fixed effects 
for each country, but the result of the F test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
inclusion of an individual fixed effect for each country is redundant, and thus the fixed 
effect model is not superior to the pooling model. Despite this result, and to control for 
country characteristics and for comparison, the estimation results of the fixed effect 
model are reported.  
This analysis also decided to be cautious about the cross-section correlation. The 
interest variable and NRR movement are highly correlated across countries because 
they are affected by international price movements. To deal with this cross-sectional 
correlation, the seemingly unrelated (SUR) model is employed (Avery, 1977).  
Country selection is based on a total natural resource rent that is greater than 30% 
of GDP, but the selection was strongly restricted to the available data. All countries are 
developing countries and the GDP scale and industrial structure greatly differ among 
countries. However, as mentioned above, these uncontrolled country characteristics do 
not seem to play a large role here. On the other hand, each variable is denominated by 
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GDP or converted to the growth rate to circumvent a heteroscedasticity bias or serial 
correlation, as long as the conversions do not affect the interpretation of the value. 
Moreover, the existence of panel-unit roots is tested using the Levin, Lin, and Chu test 
(LLC test) and Breitung test for a common unit root across the cross section (Levin et al, 
2002; Breitung, 2000). For the variables used in the regression, both tests rejected the 
null hypothesis with the 1% significance level that the series have a unit root process 
(Table 3). 
  
(d) Results 
Table 4 shows the regression results of the fixed effect model, and Table 5 shows 
the results of the SUR model. In each model, a one-term lag of KF1 is large and 
statistically significant. This can be interpreted as the hysteresis of capital flight, but this 
can also be due to a weak serial correlation in KF1, even though the existence of the 
unit-root process is rejected by tests.   
In the SUR model, NRR has a positive effect on capital flight and transfer, 
although in the fixed effect model, it is not statistically significant on capital flight. This 
result presents good reason to perceive a linkage between resource revenue and capital 
flight, but it is possible that some specific countries strongly affect the results. On the 
other hand, the positive effect of NRR on capital transfer implies that capital transfer 
increases as international resource prices and corporate profits increase, thus the linkage 
between the inflow of resource revenue and capital transfer also exists. While this is 
quite a natural result, the coefficient size is noteworthy, as discussed below.  
DEBT has positive, significant effects on capital flight and transfer, but the fixed 
effect model does not support this result. Nevertheless, the results show that a linkage 
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between capital inflow as new foreign borrowing and capital flight still exists, as 
presented in the literature on Latin American debt in the 1980s. FDI has a negative 
effect on capital flight in both models, implying that in an economy that is sound 
enough to attract FDI, people do not feel the need to move their private assets abroad. 
The effect of FDI on capital transfer is positive and significant in both models. 
Contrary to the capital flight literature, INFLATION has a negative sign in both 
models, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. This may be because, in 
resource-rich countries, higher resource prices and economic growth are inevitably 
associated with inflation. On the other hand, the effect on capital transfer is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that higher inflation is associated with accelerated 
capital transfers.  
The oil resource rent share, OILRENTS, as an indicator of dependency on crude 
oil, is positive but it is only statistically significant in the regression on capital transfer 
in the SUR model. This can be interpreted to mean that oil countries’ characteristics are 
not very different from those of other resource-rich countries, and thus the effect of the 
oil-rent share is captured by NRR.  
Finally, SSA included in the SUR model has a positive sign in the capital flight 
estimation, although the statistical significance is on the border. Thus, the suggestion by 
some studies that capital flight from African countries is much more serious than from 
Latin American countries is weakly supported here. Contrarily, the Sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy has a negative sign for the capital transfer estimation. This suggests that the 
scale of capital transferred from Sub-Saharan African countries is less than that of other 
regions. However, it should be noted that, on average, the African countries have 
weaker legal and law enforcement systems, and thus, it is possible that much capital is 
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omitted from the figures declared as profits that are presented to the authorities.  
  
While the equations are specified identically for both capital flight and transfer, the 
coefficient of NRR in the regression of capital transfer turns out to be much larger.  
From the estimation results in Table 4 and 5, a 1% change in NRR increases capital 
flight as a share of GDP by about 0.027 to 0.035 percentage points on average. On the 
other hand, a 1% change in foreign debt increases on an average of about 0.1 to 0.18 
percentage points of capital flight as a share of GDP. This can be interpreted that the 
borrowed capital inflow is more strongly related to the capital flight than earned capital 
inflow.  
On capital transfer, a 1% change in NRR increases capital transfer by 0.29 to 
0.33% on average. While the change in NRR should not be directly interpreted as a 
price change, there is a strong correlation between the two factors, and the international 
resource price is very volatile. For example, on an annual basis, between 1990 and 2011, 
the average annual crude oil price change rate was around 10%, but from 1999 to 2000, 
the crude oil price jumped about 60%. In this extreme case, with the production cost and 
quantity being equal, capital transfer from RRDCs is estimated to have increased by 
about 17 to 20%.  
For comparison, the same set of explanatory variables is regressed on the real GDP 
growth rate and on gross fixed capital formation, to examine NRR’s contribution. The 
regression results are shown in Table 6. From the results, a 1% change in NRR 
increased the GDP by only 0.02% in result (e) with SUR model. Moreover, the change 
in NRR did not contribute to gross domestic capital formation, namely to domestic 
investment. Comparing the contribution of NRR to each factor implies that capital 
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transfer increases steadily and proportionally to the international resource price change, 
while RRDCs’ economies do not benefit from price change as much as foreign 
companies do.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the capital outflow from RRDCs by calculating the amount 
of capital flight and transfer from these countries. It also analyzes the determinants of 
capital flight and transfer by using a macro panel data. Through the calculation of 
capital flight and outflow, it is suggested that capital flight from RRDCs are not as 
serious as the case of Latin American countries in the 1980s. The panel data analysis 
suggests that the argument of previous literature on capital flight and its linkage with 
public debt inflow still holds for the period 1990–2011. Changes in NNR as a proxy for 
international resource price has an explanatory power on changes in capital flight and 
transfer, and the effect of NNR on capital transfer is especially noteworthy.  
The literature on capital flight has long discussed the domestic macroeconomic 
situation and the failure of economic policy or institutional flaws as the causes of capital 
flight. In other words, the causes of capital flight have been sought in capital-flight 
suffering countries. However, this analysis of the 21 RRDCs analyzed here suggested 
that the capital outflow through TNCs is much larger than capital flight. Although it is 
natural that certain amount of capital is transferred as returns to FDI, the amount and 
pace of capital transferred from RRDCs is greater and steadier than that at which 
resource revenues of RRDCs contribute to the domestic economies. Because many 
RRDCs’ economies are dependent on FDI in their natural resource industries, large 
scale of capital outflow in the form of transfer to TNCs can be seen as a necessary evil 
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associated with economic development. Further study is needed to contribute to the 
literature regarding the extent to which capital outflows from developing countries are 
admissible, and the point at which they are considered excessive. 
In recent years, international capital movement has substantially increased, and this 
change should also have affected the developing countries so that the mechanism of 
capital inflow to and outflow from developing countries should also have shifted. The 
analysis of this shift is a task for future analysis.  
As the Asian experience shows, the roles and contributions of FDI for developing 
countries’ economies are crucial, as those countries are capital scarce and in need of 
technology and investment. To prevent excess capital outflow, RRDCs’ governments 
must provide conditions that attract domestic reinvestment. In other words, they must 
establish the rule of law and foster reinvestment in the non-mining sectors. TNC 
activities are expected to grow further in the future and their impact on developing 
countries’ economies will also grow. This suggests the need to focus on the outflow of 
capital from RRDCs through TNCs. 
  
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   28 
References 
Ajayi, S. I. (1995). Capital Flight and External Debt in Nigeria. AERC Research Paper, 
35, African Economic Research Consortium. 
Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources, 
Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability. The World 
Economy, 29(1), 63-77. 
Auty, R. M. (1990). Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight 
Exporting Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Auty, R. M. (2006). Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst: Large Mineral Projects in 
Developing Countries. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13(1), 135-145. 
Avery, R. B. (1977). Error Components and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. 
Econometrica, 45(1), 199-209. 
Barnes, S. T. (2005). Global Flows: Terror, Oil & Strategic Philanthropy. Review of 
African Political Economy, 32(104/105), 235-252. 
Boyce, J. K. (1992). The Revolving Door? The External Debt and Capital Flight: A 
Philippine Case Study. World Development, 20(3), 335-349. 
Boyce, J. K, & Ndikumana, L. (2001). Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimates of 
Capital Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-96. 
Journal of Development Studies, 38(2), 27-56. 
Breitung, J. (2000). The Local Power of Some Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. In B. 
Baltagi (Ed.), Advances in Econometrics 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel 
Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels (pp. 161-178). Amsterdam: JAI Press. 
Budina, N., Pang, G. & van Wijnbergen, S. (2007). Nigeria’s Growth Record: Dutch 
Disease or Debt Overhang? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4256. 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   29 
Budina, N. & and van Wijnbergen, S. (2008). Managing Oil Revenue Volatility in 
Nigeria: The Role of Fiscal Policy. In D. S. Go & J. Page (Eds.), Africa at a 
Turning Point?: Growth, Aid, and External Shocks. Washington D.C.: World 
Bank Publications. 
Cuddington, J. T. (1986). Capital Flight: Estimates, Issues, and Explanations. Princeton 
Studies in International Finance, 58, 1-40. 
Cuddington, J. T. (1987). Macroeconomic Determinants of Capital Flight: An 
Econometric Investigation. In D. R. Lessard & J. Williamson (Eds.), Capital 
Flight and Third World Debt (pp. 85-100). New York: Institute for International 
Economics. 
Cuddington, J. T. (1989). Commodity Export Booms in Developing Countries. The 
World Bank Research Observer, 4(2), 143-165.  
Corden, W. M. & Neary, J. P. (1982). Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a 
Small Open Economy. The Economic Journal, 92, 825-848. 
Corden, W. M. (1984). Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and 
Consolidation. Oxford Economic Papers, new Series 36(3), 359-380. 
de Mello Jr., L. R. (1997). Foreign direct investment in developing countries and 
growth: A selective survey. The Journal of Development Studies, 34(1), 1-34. 
Dooley, M. (1988). Capital Flight: A Response to Differences in Financial Risks. IMF 
Staff Papers, 35(3), 422-436. 
Dooley, M., Helkie, W., Tryon, R. & Underwood, J. (1986). An Analysis of External 
Debt Positions of Eight Developing Countries through 1990. Journal of 
Development Economics, 21, 283-318. 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   30 
Dornbusch, R. (1985). External Debt, Budget Deficits, and Disequilibrium Exchange 
Rates. In G. W. Smith & J. T. Cuddington (Eds.), International Debt and the 
Developing Countries (pp. 213-235). Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Ferguson, J. (2005). Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital 
in Neoliberal Africa. American Anthropologist, 107(3), 377-382. 
Ferguson, J. (2006). Global Shadows: Africa in the global order. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press.  
Gelb, A. H. (1988). Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hermes, N. & Lensink, R. (1992). The Magnitude and Determinants of Capital Flight: 
The Case for Six Sub-Saharan African Countries. De Economist, 140(4), 
515-530. 
International Monetary Fund (2009). Balance of Payment and International Investment 
Position Manual: Sixth Edition. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm. 
International Monetary Fund (2012). Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for 
Resource-rich Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 
from http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/082412.pdf. 
International Monetary Fund (2013). Balance of Payments, CD-ROM. 
Jones, G. (1993). British Multinational Banking 1830-1990. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Jones, G. (2005). Multinationals and Global Capitalism: from the Nineteenth to the 
Twenty-first Century. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kant, C. (1996). Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Flight. Princeton Studies in 
International Finance, 80, 1-33. 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   31 
Karl, T. L. (1997). Paradox of Plenty. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Karl, T. L. (2007). Ensuring Fairness. In M. Humphreys, J. D. Sachs & J. E. Stiglitz 
(Eds.), Escaping Resource Curse (pp. 256-285). New York: Colombia 
University Press. 
Lessard, D. R. & Williamson, J. (1987). The Problem and Policy Responses. In D. R. 
Lessard & J. Williamson (Eds.), Capital Flight and Third World Debt (pp. 
201-254). Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Levin, A., Lin, C. F., & Chu, C. (2002). Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and 
Finite-Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1–24. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986). World Financial Markets, March. New York: 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York.  
National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria (2011). Foreign Trade Statistics: Second Quarter 
2011, 499. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics. 
Ndikumana, L. & Boyce, J. K. (2003). Public Debt and Private Assets: Explaining 
Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries. World Development, 31 (1), 
107-130. 
Ndikumana, L. & Boyce, J. K. (2011a). Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages 
with external borrowing and policy options. International Review of Applied 
Economics, 25(2), 149-170. 
Ndikumana, L. & Boyce, J. K. (2011b). Africa’s Odious Debts. London: Zed Books. 
Nissanke, M. (2010). Commodity Market Structures, Evolving Governance and Policy 
Issues. In M. Nissanke & G. Mavrotas (Eds.), Commodities, Governance and 
Economic Development under Globalization (pp. 65-98). Hampshire and New 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   32 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Otusanya, O. J. (2011). The role of multinational companies in tax evasion and tax 
avoidance: The case of Nigeria. Critical Perspective on Accounting, 22, 
316-332. 
Pastor, M., Jr. (1990). Capital Flight from Latin America. World Development, 18(1), 
1-18.  
Ross, M. (2012). The Oil Curse. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Sachs, J. & Warner, A. W. (1995). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.  
NBER Working Paper 5398. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
Sachs, J. & Warner, A. W. (2001). The Curse of Natural Resources. European 
Economic Review 45, 827-838.  
Schneider, B. (2003). Measuring Capital Flight: Estimates and Interpretations. Working 
Paper 194. London: Overseas Development Institute.  
Shaxson, N. (2011). Treasure Islands. London: Bodley Head/Random House.  
Walter, I. (1987). The Mechanism of Capital Flight. In D. R. Lessard & J. Williamson 
(Eds.), Capital Flight and Third World Debt (pp. 103-128). Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics. 
Walter, I. (1989). Secret Money. London: Unwin Hyman Limited.  
World Bank (1993). Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank (2011). The Changing Wealth of Nations. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank (2013a). World Development Indicators. Retrieved from World DataBank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/.  
World Bank (2013b). International Debt Statistics. Retrieved from World DataBank, 
 
 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TRANSFER FROM RRDCs   33 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/.  
World Economic Forum, the World Bank & the African Development Bank (2011). The 
Africa Competitiveness Report 2011. Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. In the BOP data, foreign reserve increase is regarded as an equivalent of capital 
outflow, and thus, the figure is entered with a negative sign. Applying this BOP 
notation to equation (2), 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾1 = ∆𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + (𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹)𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 + ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 deficit. In 
the latest BOP updates, data after 2005 are organized in accordance with the Balance 
of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6, 
IMF 2009). For estimation in this analysis, new BOP data is also utilized and signs 
are adjusted where relevant.  
2. Among many metal and energy prices, crude oil prices are most strongly correlated to 
the total natural resource rent. 
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Figure 1. Capital flight (share of GDP) 
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Figure 2. Capital transfer (share of GDP) 
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Figure 3. Natural Resource Rent and Real Oil Price (annual growth rate) 
Source: World Bank (2013a). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of capital flight and transfer as share of GDP 
 Capital flight Capital transfer 
 Mean -0.0019  0.0796  
 Median -0.0011  0.0678  
 Maximum 0.2059  0.4348  
 Minimum -0.3911  0.0064  
 Std. Dev. 0.0530  0.0601  
   
 Observations 403 403 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Summary statistics of the panel data 
 Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum 
KF1 (first difference of GDP share)  -0.003 0.111 0.608 -0.641 
KT1 (log difference) 0.070 0.304 1.923 -1.237 
KT2 (log difference) 0.088 0.306 2.029 -1.228 
NRR (log difference) 0.052 0.268 1.137 -0.970 
Debt (log difference) 0.007 0.175 0.648 -1.259 
FDI inflow (log difference) 0.045 5.599 21.396 -22.475 
Inflation 13.045 16.317 144.003 -23.479 
Oil rent 16.282 15.796 75.708 0.000 
SSA (dummy) 0.188 0.391 1.000 0.000 
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Table 3. Panel unit root test results 
Series  
  
  
  
  
Test common unit root 
Levin, Lin and Chua 
  
Breitunga 
KF Level (constant US$) -0.357 4.533 
GDP share -2.200** 2.496 
First difference of GDP share -15.332*** -2.218** 
KT1 Level (constant US$) -0.923 2.828 
GDP share -3.161*** -2.522*** 
Log difference -14.006*** -7.609*** 
KT2 Level (constant US$) -0.298 4.064 
GDP share -3.207*** -2.787*** 
Log difference -12.740*** -8.240*** 
NRR Level (constant US$) -1.0877** 1.255 
GDP share -3.850*** -1.080 
Log difference -12.770*** -4.340*** 
Debt Level (constant US$) 0.102 3.765 
GDP share -4.174*** 0.308 
Log difference -14.814*** -4.213*** 
FDI Level (constant US$) -1.254  1.1417 
GDP share -4.407*** -3.122*** 
Log difference -14.836*** -2.346*** 
Inflation Percentage from ba -39.226*** -6.067*** 
Oil rent GDP share -4.989*** -3.882*** 
a. Both unit root tests include individual intercept and trend. Lag lengths are selected 
according to the Schwartz Information Criterion.  
** and *** denotes 5% and 1% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of capital flight and transfer: fixed effect model. 
 fixed effect model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  KF KF KT1 KT1 KT2 KT2 
       
C -0.0029 -0.0230 0.0198 -0.0292 0.0480** -0.0129 
 (0.0062) (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.0478) (0.0201) (0.0490) 
KF(-1) -0.3714*** -0.3936***       
 (0.0517) (0.0526)     
NRR 0.03480 0.0295 0.3093*** 0.2929*** 0.2732*** 0.2541***  
 (0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0552) (0.0587) (0.0568) (0.0602) 
DEBT 0.1779*** 0.1364***  0.0217 0.0560  -0.0413  -0.0041 
 (0.0332) (0.0358) (0.0852) (0.0922) (0.0877) (0.0946) 
FDI -0.0037*** -0.0024** 0.0053**  0.0057** 0.0027 0.0036 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
INFLATION -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0026**  0.0024** 0.0019*  0.0017  
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
OILRENTS  0.0012   0.0032  0.0039  
  (0.0011)  (0.0028)  (0.0028) 
N 374 370 386 383 386 383 
R-squared: 0.2346 0.2008 0.1923 0.1959 0.1541 0.1632 
       
a. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denotes 10%, 5%, 1% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 5. Determinants of capital flight and transfer: SUR model. 
 SUR Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  KF KF KT1 KT1 KT2 KT2 
       
C -0.0003 -0.0034  0.0121 -0.0009  0.0433***  0.0376*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0124) 
KF (-1) -0.4133*** -0.4292***     
 (0.0407) (0.0441)     
NRR  0.0267***  0.0291***  0.3348***  0.3302***  0.2685***  0.2723*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0256) (0.0263) 
DEBT  0.1518***  0.1079***  0.1417***  0.1827***  0.0838**  0.1191*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0312) (0.0321) (0.0378) (0.0393) 
FDI -0.0028*** -0.0018***  0.0047***  0.0051***  0.0030***  0.0038*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
INFLATION -0.0001 -0.0001  0.0020***  0.0019***  0.0019***  0.0019*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
OILRENTS   0.0003   0.0011**   0.0003 
  (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
SSA  0.0140*  0.0096 -0.0620*** -0.0662** -0.0714*** -0.0612*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0232) (0.0261) (0.0177) (0.0218) 
N 374 370 386 383 386 383 
R-squared: 0.5197 0.4306 0.5716 0.5847 0.3440 0.3410 
       
a. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denotes 10%, 5%, 1% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 6. Regression results on real GDP and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)ab 
 fixed effect model  SUR model 
 (a) (b) (c) (d)  (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  Real GDP Real GDP GFCF GFCF  Real GDP Real GDP GFCF GFCF 
          
C 0.0672*** -0.0831*** 0.0669***  0.0034   0.0765***  0.0574**  0.0682**  0.0599** 
 (0.0075) (0.0222) (0.0097) (0.0287)  (0.0062) (0.0072) * (0.0060) * (0.0097) * 
NRR 0.0438 -0.0135 -0.0086 -0.0327   0.0202**  0.0042 -0.0143 -0.0165 
 (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0333) (0.0346)  (0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
DEBT -0.0191 -0.0188 0.0180  0.0251   0.0018 -0.0096  0.0445**  0.0417* 
 (0.0327) (0.0324) (0.0430) (0.0428)  (0.0063) (0.0080) (0.0224) (0.0225) 
FDI 0.0025* 0.0032*** 0.0020  0.0020   0.0022***  0.0026**  0.0018**  0.0017** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015)  (0.0003) (0.0003) * (0.0006) * (0.0006) * 
INFLATION -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0000) * (0.0001) * (0.0001) * 
OILRENTSS  0.0089***   
 
   0.0011**   0.0004 
  (0.0013)  (0.0016)   (0.0002) *  (0.0004) 
SSA      -0.0197*** -0.0230**  0.0219  0.0242 
      (0.0040) (0.0051) * (0.0200) (0.0202) 
N 432 428 314 314  432 428 314 314 
R-squared 0.0711 0.1846 0.0868 0.1036  0.2444 0.3116 0.0736 0.0716 
          
a. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
b. Dependent variables are in log difference form.  
*, **, *** denotes 10%, 5%, 1% level significance, respectively. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix a. List of the countries included in the sample 
Algeria Gabon a Papua New Guinea 
Azerbaijan Guinea a Russia 
Bolivia Guyana Syria 
Chile Indonesia Venezuela 
Congo a Kazakhstan Vietnam 
Ecuador Malaysia Yemen 
Egypt Nigeria a Zambia a 
a. Categorized as Sub-Saharan African country in the analysis.  
 
 
Appendix b. The data sources used for estimation of capital flight and transfer 
Data Definition Source 
FDI Net of foreign direct investment inflow and outflow, current US$. 
Balance of payment (IMF) 
Portfolio investment Net of portfolio investment inflow and outflow, current US$. 
Balance of payment (IMF) 
Debt transfer Total change in external debt stocks, current US$. 
International debt statistics 
(World Bank) 
Capital account balance Balance on goods, services and incomes. Balance of payment (IMF) 
Foreign reserve change Annual change of reserved asset Balance of payment (IMF) 
Primary income debit Primary income, total debit, current US$. Balance of payment (IMF) 
Secondary income debit Secondary income, debit, current US$. Balance of payment (IMF) 
 
Appendix c. The data sources used for the panel estimation  
Data Definition Source 
KF1 Calculated as described in the text. Converted to constant US$.  --- 
KT1 Calculated as described in the text. Converted to constant US$.  --- 
KT2 Calculated as described in the text. Converted to constant US$.  --- 
NRR Total natural resource rent in level is calculated by multiplying the original data (% of GDP) with constant GDP.  
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
DEBT External debt stocks, total. Original data in current US$ is converted to constant US$.  
International debt statistics 
(World Bank) 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting economy. Converted to current US$. 
International debt statistics 
(World Bank) 
INFRATION Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
OILRENTS Crude oil rent share in GDP. World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
SSA Dummy. If Sub-Saharan African country, 1, otherwise, 0. --- 
 
 
 
 
